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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Affirmed The Magistrate's Order Suppressing 
Evidence Obtained By Implied Consent 
A. I ntrod uction 
Both the magistrate and the district judge on intermediate appeal 
concluded that implied consent is not a viable exception to the warrant 
requirement, and therefore evidence of a blood draw from Arrotta should be 
suppressed. (Tr., p. 118, Ls. 13-19; R., p. 118.) The lower courts erred because 
the conclusion that implied consent is not a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement is in direct conflict with precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court and 
the Supreme Court of the United States. (Appellant's brief, pp. 5-7.) Arrotta 
responds by first contending that the blood draw was not justified by exigent 
circumstances. (Respondent's brief, pp. 6-9.) He next argues that the blood 
draw was not taken by voluntary consent. (Respondent's brief, pp. 9-10.) The 
state agrees that it did not establish either exigent circumstances or voluntary 
consent in this case. Such is, however, irrelevant to the claim the state does 
make, which is that the blood draw was justified by implied consent. The state 
will therefore not respond further to these arguments. 
Relevant, but no less erroneous, are Arrotta's arguments that he had the 
legal authority to revoke his implied consent (Respondent's brief, pp. 10-11); that 
the Idaho Constitution prohibits implied consent by granting greater rights than 
the Fourth Amendment (Respondent's brief, pp. 11-12); that implied consent 
violated the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" (Respondent's brief, pp. 12-
20); and that the Supreme Court of the United States has held that only exigent 
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circumstances or voluntary consent are viable exceptions to the warrant 
requirement (Respondent's brief, pp. 20-21). These arguments fail for 
following reasons: It is well established that motorists suspected of driving under 
the influence do not have legal authority to revoke implied consent; the argument 
that the Idaho Constitution grants broader protections than the Fourth 
Amendment is neither preserved nor meritorious; the "unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine" does not apply; and, rather than disapproving, the Supreme Court of 
the United States has upheld and endorsed implied consent. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a district court order granting or denying a 
suppression motion is bifurcated: factual findings are accepted unless clearly 
erroneous, but the Court freely reviews the application of constitutional principles 
to the facts found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 
(2009). On review of a decision rendered by a district court in its intermediate 
appellate capacity, the reviewing court "directly review[s] the district court's 
decision to determine whether it correctly decided the issues presented to it on 
appeal." Borley v. Smith, 149 Idaho 171, 176, 233 P.3d 102, 107 (2010); see 
also Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 183 P.3d 758 (2008). 
C. It Is Well-Established That Motorists Do Not Have The Right To Revoke 
Implied Consent 
In Idaho, motorists suspected of DUI do not have the legal ability to 
revoke implied consent. State v. McCormack, 117 Idaho 1009, 1013-14, 793 
P.2d 682, 686-87 (1990) (although driver has "physical ability" to refuse he has 
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no right to "withdraw his implied consent"); State v. Woolery, 116 Idaho 368, 372-
73,775 P.2d 1210, 1215-16 (1989)1; State v. LeClercq, 149 Idaho 905,909,243 
P.3d 1093, 1097 (Ct. App. 2010); State v. Cooper, 136 Idaho 697, 699-700, 39 
P.3d 637, 639-40 (Ct. App. 2001). Arrotta's argument that because he had the 
right to revoke voluntary consent he had the right to revoke his implied consent 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 10-11) is without legal merit. 
D. Arrotta's Claim That The State Constitution Has A Different Warrant 
Requirement Than The Fourth Amendment Is Neither Preserved Nor 
Meritorious 
The state constitution will not be interpreted differently from corresponding 
provisions of the federal constitution unless there is a "cogent reason" to do so. 
State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130, 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Moreover, a claim that the state constitution provides great protection than the 
federal constitution must be preserved in the trial court. State v. Wheaton, 121 
Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 501, 504 (1992). Interpretation of analogous 
constitutional provisions by the Supreme Court of the United States controls 
"unless clear precedent or circumstances unique to the state of Idaho or its 
constitution indicates" greater protections. CDA Dairy Queen, Inc. v. State Ins. 
Fund, 154 Idaho 379, 384, 299 P.3d 186, 191 (2013). 
1 The portion of the opinion in Woolery holding that that "the destruction of [blood 
alcohol content] evidence provides an inherent exigency which justified the 
warrantless search" of a blood draw, 116 Idaho at 370-71,775 P.2d at 1212-13, 
was abrogated in Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1558 n.2 (2013). The 
Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the Idaho implied consent law remains 
good law, 
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Arrotta's motion to suppress was based exclusively upon the Fourth 
Amendment. (R., pp. 37-41.) The claim the Idaho Constitution provides greater 
protection in this case is not preserved for appellate review. Even if preserved 
Arrotta has failed to show a "cogent reason," much less "clear precedent or 
circumstances unique to the state of Idaho or its constitution" indicating greater 
protection. Indeed, his only argument is that because the Idaho Supreme Court 
held that there is no good faith exception to the exclusionary rule there should be 
no implied consent exception to the warrant requirement. (Appellant's brief, pp. 
11-12.) Having failed to find any cogent reason, unique circumstances, or any 
precedent indicating that the warrant requirement of the Idaho Constitution 
should be interpreted differently than the Fourth Amendment, Arrotta's argument 
also fails on the merits. 
E. The "Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine" Has No Application To Idaho's 
Implied Consent Law 
The "unconstitutional conditions doctrine" "vindicates the Constitution's 
enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into 
giving them up." Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., _ U.S. 
, 133 S.Ct. 2586, 2594 (2013). "Under the well-settled doctrine of 
'unconstitutional conditions,' the government may not require a person to give up 
a constitutional right ... in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the 
government .... " Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even 
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit 
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any 
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the 
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government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on 
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. 
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); see also Farnworth v. 
Femling, 125 Idaho 283,285,869 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1994). Thus, for example, 
the government does not have the "power to compel a private carrier to assume 
against his will the duties and burdens of a common carrier," which compulsion 
violates due process, as a "condition precedent to the enjoyment of a privilege" 
of a business license. Frost v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 592-94 
(1926). Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Idaho Supreme 
Court has applied this doctrine to invalidate implied consent laws. To the 
contrary, both courts have specifically held that implied consent laws are valid. 
See, SUl., North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 
300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007). Arrotta makes two arguments for 
extending the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invalidate implied consent, 
neither of which have merit. 2 
Arrotta argues that other courts have applied the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine to reject implied consent. (Respondent's brief, pp. 15-20.) 
Review shows that this argument is, at best, overstated. In all of the cases cited 
2 Despite his request that this Court overrule precedent, Arrotta fails to cite the 
standard for doing so. Controlling precedent must be followed "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
unless overruling it is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 
(2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) 
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 
983 (1990)). 
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the courts suppressed blood draws taken in an absence of probable cause to 
believe the driver was under the influence. State v. Quinn, 178 P .3d 1190 (Az. 
App. 2008) (statute allowing blood draw because of involvement in serious 
accident struck down); Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003) (same); 
Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. App. 2003) (officers lacked probable 
cause to believe driver was under the influence). Arrotta has cited to no case 
that has applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to strike down an 
implied consent statute such as Idaho's, which requires "reasonable grounds to 
believe" the driver is under the influence. I.C. § 18-8002(1 ).3 
Review of the cases cited does not demonstrate that implied consent, 
validated by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United 
States, is an "unconstitutional condition." Rather, the courts' holdings that the 
Constitution does not countenance implied consent in the absence of reason to 
believe that the driver is under the influence does not advance Arrotta's 
argument because there was probable cause in this case to believe Arrotta was 
driving under the influence of alcohol. (Tr., p. 111, L. 24 - p. 112, L. 6.) At least 
one case from one of those jurisdictions, unrecognized by Arrotta, says as much. 
See Hough v. State, 620 S.E.2d 380, 383-84 (Ga. 2005) (distinguishing Cooper 
3 The necessity of particularized suspIcion is a primary difference between 
express consent and implied consent. Express consent can be given in the 
absence of any suspicion, while implied consent requires "reasonable grounds to 
believe." Properly understood, implied consent is merely an implied waiver of 
having a judge determine probable cause before, as opposed to after, the blood 
draw is performed, not a complete waiver of applicable Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
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and holding that implied consent is constitutional where officers have probable 
cause to believe driver is under the influence). 
Arrotta also argues that implied consent "was not considered to afoul [sic] 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine due to the fact that under pre-McNeely 
jurisprudence it was believed that an individual held no constitutional right to be 
free from warrantless blood draws." (Respondent's brief, p. 15 (citations 
omitted).) Arrotta's assertion that the implied consent exception justified 
warrantless blood draws only because the exigency exception justified 
warrantless blood draws is both nonsensical and directly contrary to this Court's 
analysis in Diaz. In that case the Court stated: "Because Diaz had already given 
his implied consent to evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also 
gave his consent to a blood draw. Without addressing whether exigency also 
justified the blood draw, we hold that the seizure of Diaz's blood fell within a well-
recognized exception to the warrant requirement." l.5i at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. 
Thus, in Diaz, the blood draw was justified by the implied consent exception 
regardless of whether it was also justified by the exigency exception. The 
argument that implied consent justifies a warrantless blood draw only if exigent 
circumstances also justify the warrantless blood draw is meritless. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has upheld implied consent as a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also upheld implied consent 
statutes against constitutional attack. Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 
(1983); North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). In Missouri v. McNeely, 
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_ u.s. _, 133 S.Ct 1552, 1565-66 (2013), the Court endorsed implied 
consent as a valid law enforcement tool. The district court erred when it affirmed 
the magistrate's conclusion that implied consent was not a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement. 
F. The Supreme Court Of The United States Has Not Disavowed Implied 
Consent 
Arrotta argues that the "McNeely Court gave the clear mandate that '[i]n 
those drunk driving investigations where police officers can reasonably obtain a 
warrant before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining 
the efficacy of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.'" 
(Respondent's brief, p. 20 (emphasis original) (quoting McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 
1561).) Arrotta concludes that this quote means that "after McNeely, a motorist 
arrested on suspicion of DUI now clearly has a constitutional tight to be free from 
warrantless intrusions into their body absent the existence of either a true 
showing of exigent circumstances cause [sic] or actual valid consent." (Id.) The 
quote, however, was given in the context of determining whether the Court 
"should depart from careful case-by case assessment of exigency and adopt the 
categorical rule proposed by the State and its amici." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 
1561. In context, then, the Court merely stated that the exigent circumstances 
exception does not apply "where police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant 
before a blood sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the 
efficacy of the search." Id. The Court was not saying that a warrant was 
required in all DUI investigations absent exigency. Arrotta's acknowledgment 
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that voluntary consent is not within the scope of the language he quotes belies 
his claim that implied consent is within that scope. 
In McNeely the Supreme Court of the United States determined that to 
show application of the exigent circumstances exception the state had to show 
that a warrant could not be obtained without significantly undermining the 
efficacy of the search. The Court's determination of the scope of the exigent 
circumstances exception did not limit the scope of any other exception. 
Moreover, the Court later specifically recognized the implied consent exception 
as among the "broad range of legal tools to enforce their drunk-driving laws and 
secure BAC evidence." McNeely, 133 S.Ct. at 1566. Arrotta's argument that 
McNeely does away with the implied consent exception is without merit. 
The district court concluded that the implied consent exception is no 
longer constitutionally valid, upholding a magistrate determination to the same 
end. The law simply is opposite; the implied consent exception is a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement and allowed the blood draw in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to reverse the lower courts and 
remand for further proceedings before the magistrate division. 
DATED this 22nd day of April, 20 4. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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